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ABSTRACT
Lawson and McCauley (1990) have argued that non-cultural regularities in how
actions are conceptualized inform and constrain participants’ understandings of religious
rituals. This theory of ritual competence generates three predictions: 1) People with little or
no knowledge of any given ritual system will have intuitions about the potential effectiveness
of a ritual given minimal information about the structure of the ritual. 2) The representation
of superhuman agency in the action structure will be considered the most important factor
contributing to effectiveness. 3) Having an appropriate intentional agent initiate the action
will be considered relatively more important than any speci c action to be performed.
These three predictions were tested in two experiments with 128 North American
Protestant college students who rated the probability of various  ctitious rituals to
be effective in bringing about a speci ed consequence. Results support Lawson and
McCauley’s predictions and suggest that expectations regarding ordinary social actions
apply to religious rituals.
Ritual Intuitions: Cognitive Contributions to Judgments of
Ef cacy
In many different cultures throughout history, people have tried to
persuade gods to act in the natural world through the use of prayers
and ritual actions. Much as in asking the boss for a raise or a parent for a
favor, religious practitioners represent these activities as social actions. But
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how do practitioners decide on an appropriate interaction with the gods?
How rituals should be performed? What knowledge is drawn upon?
Recent research in the study of religion from a cognitive perspective
has emphasized that much as ordinary and imaginative thought is
constrained and informed by conceptual structures (Ward 1995); so too
religious concepts rely on ordinary cognition (Barrett 2000; Boyer 1994).
For example, intuitive expectations about the properties of human-like
intentional agents are applied to God when solving real-time problems,
even when these expectations violate explicit theological convictions
(Barrett 1998, 1999; Barrett & Keil 1996). Thus, god concepts may be
largely informed by knowledge that is not culturally speci c, nor needs to
be explicitly transmitted (Boyer 1994, 1995).
Similarly, Lawson and McCauley (1990) have argued that religious
ritual actions across cultures appear to have structural regularities under-
explained by the reputed meanings of the actions. They note that ritual
actions (despite their unusual qualities) are cognitively represented as
actions. Whether a ritual action involves waving a wand to ward off
witches, building a pyramid to facilitate the departure of a pharaoh to
the realm of the gods, or lighting a  re to ensure the presence of a
superhuman agent, it still requires using ordinary cognitive resources in
its representation.
However, religious rituals are also a particular type of action. In such
representations someone does something to someone or something in order
to bring about some non-natural consequence. That is, rituals are actions
that are performed to accomplish something that would not normally
follow from this speci c action. For example, a person who strikes a special
pot in order to bring rain would be performing a ritual; whereas, a person
who strikes a special pot in order to create pottery fragments, would not
be performing a ritual.
Because this ritual action violates natural intuitive causal expectations,
the difference in consequence must be justi ed in the minds of participants
or observers. Even observers with little cultural knowledge of a particular
religious system will still have intuitions that superhuman agency must be
involved for the action to work. If a person smashes a pot with a staff in
hopes of bringing rain, people will guess that not just any ordinary person
smashing any ordinary pot with any ordinary staff will be successful at
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bringing rain. Some non-mechanistic, non-natural form of causation must
be at play. The action must be cognitively tagged as more than it seems.
If the tag is some connection or appeal to superhuman agency, then the
action quali es as a religious ritual, say Lawson and McCauley.
Once an act is represented as appealing in some way to a superhuman
intentional agent to account for the expected consequence, then the
most  tting mode of causal cognition to use to generate inferences is
social causation. Indeed, structurally, religious rituals mirror social actions:
someone performs some kind of action in order to motivate another’s
action or change in disposition. It just so happens that the person being
motivated to act is a god or other non-natural agent.
If people do apply ordinary representations of social actions to reason
about religious rituals, one general and two speci c empirical predictions
follow:
1) Insofar as cross-cultural regularities in social cognition exist, individ-
uals unfamiliar with a particular ritual, religious system, or any religious
rituals at all, would have converging intuitions about whether or not a
particular ritual is likely to be ef cacious. Much as in making grammatical
judgments about sentences apart from semantic considerations, judgments
of ritual well-formedness may be made divorced from sophisticated un-
derstanding of the religious meaning. That is, ritually naïve subjects would
have converging opinions about what makes a good, effective ritual a good,
effective ritual.
2) Speci cally, ritually naïve individuals would appreciate the central
importance of superhuman agency being represented somewhere in the
ritual structure to account for proposed non-natural consequences. A
woman striking a sick man with a staff does not cure him unless the
woman, the staff, the man, or some combination of them has some special
connection to an agent (or agents) with special qualities. Otherwise, instead
of a recovery you only get bruises. When judging if an unfamiliar ritual is
effective, individuals will consider some connection to superhuman agency
more important than any other aspect of the ritual including the choice of
speci c agent involved, of object, of action, or of instruments if any.
3) Finally, and most interestingly, because religious rituals are social
actions and social actions require appropriate agents, having an appro-
priate agent for a given ritual will be the factor judged most important
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in its success or failure after connection to superhuman agency. Speci -
cally, since rituals are intended events evoking superhuman intervention,
an agent that can reasonably intend to achieve the speci ed consequence
of the ritual must initiate the action. For example, a marriage ceremony
must be performed by a person who, presumably, intends to see the par-
ticipants married as a consequence. A talking parrot trained to say all the
right words would not be an adequate replacement because of lack of in-
tent. Consequently, individuals unfamiliar with a ritual (or any rituals) will
judge the agent in a ritual to be relatively more important to the rituals’
success than the particular action the agent performs.
Note that while this third prediction counters the folk notion of rituals
as a set of highly speci ed actions that must be performed just so, it
parallels a simple observation about social actions in general. Unlike when
bringing about a physical or mechanistic consequence, such as breaking a
window, in social interactions the actor’s intentions are critical. Similarly,
in religious rituals it is predicted that having an appropriate agent — one
who can intend to act toward certain ends — will matter more to the
success of the ritual than the speci c action performed.
We tested these predictions using two experiments in which adult
participants reasoned about the potential ef cacy of  ctitious rituals. If
expectations regarding the potential ef cacy of ritual form through learning
arbitrary social conventions, then participants would have no converging
intuitions about the success or failure of unfamiliar rituals such as those
used in these experiments. In the  rst experiment, predictions regarding
the importance of superhuman agency being represented in the action
structure and the relative importance of having an appropriate agent over
performing a particular action were tested. Experiment 2 focused on the
relative importance of particular agents over particular actions in rituals
compared with non-ritual actions.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects. Sixty-eight students recruited from introductory psychology courses
at an American Midwest liberal arts college participated. They ranged in
age from 17- to 22-years old, with a mean age of 18.6 years. Forty were
female, 28 male. Participants were almost exclusively Protestant Christians
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with the majority identifying with the Christian Reformed Church, a de-
nomination for which (at least theologically speaking) there are no religious
rituals as operationalized above. Indeed, American Protestants in general
have at most only  ve religious rituals: Communion, baptism, ordination,
marriage and funerals. So that participants could not draw on their per-
sonal religious knowledge, none of the  ctitious rituals used resembled any
of these  ve observances.
Materials. A packet of twelve randomly ordered ritual sets was prepared. At
the top of the  rst page of each packet, participants recorded age, sex, and
religious af liation, and then read these instructions: “For the following
ratings ‘special’ means someone or something that has been given special
properties or authority by the gods.” The twelve sets of rituals followed.
For each of the twelve sets, a prototype ritual was followed by
twelve variations including a reiteration of the prototype. In one-fourth
of the prototypes, the agent was described as “special”, in one-fourth the
instrument was “special”, in one-fourth both the agent and the instrument
were “special”, and in one-fourth nothing was labeled “special.” These
designations were counterbalanced so that each particular ritual appeared
(across participants) in the same form the same number of times.
To systematically probe intuitions regarding the relative contributions
of each element in the prototype to the success of the action, the
theoretically relevant components of the prototypes were varied within-
subjects. The presence or absence of the term “special”, the agent
performing the action, the action itself, and the instrument used were
manipulated independently. In total, the twelve variations following each
prototype included: (1) a version of the prototype with both the agent
and instrument designated ‘special’, (2) a version with only the agent
designated ‘special’, (3) a version with only the instrument designated
‘special’, (4) a version with nothing special but otherwise identical to the
prototype, (5) a minor agent change (to an animal) with the agent labeled
‘special’, (6) a minor agent change with no specialness, (7) a major agent
change (to an inanimate object) with specialness, (8) a major agent change
without specialness, (9 & 10) two action changes otherwise identical to
the prototype, (11) an instrument change with specialness, and (12) an
instrument change without specialness. Table 1 illustrates the various items.
Each permutation was followed by a seven-point rating scale anchored as
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Table 1
Experiment 1 sample item. A successful religious action: A special person blew ordinary
dust on a eld and the eld yielded good crops. How likely is each of following actions
to nd favor with the gods and yield good crops? Please rate each action: 1 D extremely
likely the action will work, 7 D extremely unlikely
a) A special person blew special dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) A special person blew ordinary dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c) An ordinary person blew special dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d) An ordinary person blew ordinary dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e) A special rat blew ordinary dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f) An ordinary rat blew ordinary dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g) A special branch blew ordinary dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
h) An ordinary branch blew ordinary dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i) A special person threw ordinary dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j) A special person kicked ordinary dust on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k) A special person blew special feathers on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l) A special person blew ordinary feathers on a  eld. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
“1 D extremely likely the action will work” and “7 D extremely unlikely.”
The rituals were arbitrarily generated and not meant to be similar to any
real religious rituals.
Procedure. Participants were told nothing about the purpose of the study, but
simply recorded their age and sex on the response sheets and proceeded
with the ratings.
Predictions. The social action hypothesis adapted from Lawson and Mc-
Cauley predicts that the most important factor driving participants’ ratings
of the likelihood for the action variations to succeed would be having a
“special” agent or instrument, and secondarily, having the same agent as
the prototype. That is, given that these are unusual actions requiring some-
thing “special” in the action structure, social-causal expectations would be
triggered and the same agent as the prototype would be considered more
important to the success of the ritual than having the same action.
The social action hypothesis must be distinguished from a matching
hypothesis. First, if participants had no intuitions regarding the importance
of any particular element of the ritual, then a reasonable strategy for
generating ratings would be to rate permutations that more closely matched
the successful prototype as more likely to work. Consequently, for rituals in
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which no specialness was mentioned, the non-special replication would be
rated as more likely to succeed than the other three versions with ‘special’
labels. So, for example, if the prototype described “An ordinary person
blew ordinary dust on a  eld and the  eld yielded good crops,” then
versions of the prototype that are most similar to the prototype — even
having no “special” agents or instruments — would be rated as most likely
to succeed. The version of the prototype “A special person blew special
dust: : :” should be rated as less likely to be successful than the reiteration
of the prototype, the version with a special agent, or the version with a
special instrument.
Likewise, since 50 percent of the prototypes had special agents and 50
percent had special instruments, but only 25 percent had ‘special’ agents
and instruments or neither, this matching hypothesis would predict that
overall the one-‘special’ permutations would have lower ratings (i.e. are
more likely to succeed) than either the two-‘special’ items or the no-‘special’
items, which should not differ from each other. Alternatively, the social
action hypothesis would be that the items with two special elements should
have scores at least as low as the one-‘special’ items followed by no marker
items.
Results & Discussion
A single score was calculated for each of the change factors to be
considered by averaging across the items from the twelve ritual sets. This
produced scores for agent changes with the agent being special (e.g., items
like e and g in Table 1 for all 12 ritual sets), agent changes without the
agent being special (e.g., items f and h), instrument changes (items k and l),
action changes (items i and j); reiterations of the prototype with nothing
special (e.g. item d), when two components were special (item a), when
only the agent was special (item b), and when only the instrument was
special (item c).
The theoretically relevant inferential comparisons were made between
these scores using t-tests for paired samples. All contrasts were planned and
since essentially all of the tests performed were signi cant, this design does
 t the conditions for multiple test corrections. However, all theoretically
interesting differences do remain signi cant after application of Bonferroni
corrections for multiple t-tests. Uncorrected values are reported. No
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omnibus ANOVA test is reported because only item-type differences are
of interest.
If a particular change to the prototypes led to higher scores (less
likely to succeed) than another change, then the changed component was
regarded as relatively more important to the success of the ritual.
Figure 1 displays the comparisons between the different specialness
items. As predicted by the social action hypothesis and contrary to the
matching hypothesis, the two-‘special’ items were rated signi cantly lower
than the other marker items, M D 2:00, SD D 1:22, t .67/ D 7:15,
p < :001 (compared to the next closest type of item). The two-‘special’
items were even rated more likely to succeed than the no-‘special’ items
when the prototype had no ‘special’ label and so the no-‘special’ choices
best matched the successful actions, t .67/ D 2:95, p D :004. The two
forms of one-‘special’ items did not differ signi cantly from each other
(t .67/ D 1:29, p D :20) but had signi cantly lower average ratings than
the no-‘special’ items: M D 3:06, SD D 1:20 for the special instruments
(t .67/ D 8:26, p < :001 versus not special); M D 2:91, SD D 1:30 for the
special agents (t .67/ D 9:75, p < :001); M D 4:65, SD D 1:32 for the no-
‘special’ items. The two one-‘special’ types did not differ signi cantly from
no-marker items when the prototype had no ‘special’ marker. It seems
‘special’ labels did matter to subjects’ judgements of the ef cacy of rituals
even if ‘special’ labels were not included in a given ritual’s prototype. That
is, even if the ritual worked without any component being special, it would
be still more likely to work when making an appeal to a superhuman agent.
The second prediction regarding ‘special’ markers was that not having
them would damage rituals’ likelihood of success more than other changes
in the action or instrument. Since some of the prototype rituals had nothing
special, testing this hypothesis is muddied. By implicitly being told one-
quarter of the time that specialness is unnecessary, subjects may have
devalued specialness relative to other features. More importantly, in no-
‘special’ prototypes, the no-‘special’ item does not constitute the removal
of ‘special’ but is a reiteration of the ritual that supposedly worked.
To eliminate these dif culties, the measure needed to represent the
importance of ‘special’-markers in the ritual structure relative to other
components was the average of no-‘special’ items only in cases when
the prototype had at least one ‘special’-marker. In these cases, the no-
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Figure 1. Mean rating of rituals’ likely effectiveness as a function of change type
performed to the prototype for Experiment 1. “S-Agent” refers to items for which
the only ‘special’ was modifying the agent. “S-Instrument” refers to items for
which the only ‘special’ was modifying the instrument. The two ‘special’-marker
items were rated as signi cantly more likely to succeed than all other types, even
no ‘special’ types when there were no ‘special’-markers in the prototype (No S
when No S). The no ‘special’-marker type is signi cantly greater than all other
types.
‘special’ condition truly indicated the removal or absence of a ‘special.’ As
predicted, this “special absent” score was greater than either the action
or instrument scores, as illustrated in Figure 2. The mean special-absent
score was 5.26, SD D 1:51, as compared with 3.60, SD D 1:07, for
action changes (t .67/ D 7:44, p < :001) and 4.39, SD D 1:15, for
instrument changes (t .67/ D 3:86, p < :001). Subject intuitions even
converged on agent changes being less important for ritual success than
the presence of ‘special’-markers. Agent change items had a mean rating
of 4.71, SD D 1:35, t .67/ D 2:36, p D :021.
Consistent with the social action predictions regarding agents, agent
changes with and without ‘special’-markers were rated as more damaging
to the possible success of the rituals than action changes. Agent changes
with a ‘special’-marker (“special” agents) had a mean rating of 4.29, SD D
1:61, signi cantly greater than ratings for action changes, t .67/ D 4:17,
p < :001. Agent changes with ‘special’-markers were not rated signi cantly
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Figure 2. Mean rating of rituals’ likely effectiveness as a function of change type
performed to the prototype for Experiment 1. “No S when S” indicates items in
which at least one ‘special’-marker was present in the prototypes but none in the
test items. Removing ‘special’-markers was rated as signi cantly more disruptive
than Action, Instrument, or Agent changes. Action changes were signi cantly
rated as more likely to succeed than Agent changes.
different than instrument changes. Agent changes without a ‘special’-
marker were judged as even more likely to ruin the rituals, M D 5:12,
SD D 1:23; and were rated signi cantly different from both action
changes (t .67/ D 10:75, p < :001) and instrument changes (t .67/ D 4:28,
p < :001).
Participants’ ratings indicated that if a ritual has no indication that the
agent or instrument involved has been endowed with special properties
or authority by a divine source (no specialness), then it is unlikely to
bring about the desired non-natural consequences. The representation
of superhuman agency somewhere in the ritual structure was judged
as more important for the success of the ritual than using the original
instrument or performing the proper action. Participants’ ratings also
suggested intuitions that more than one indication of superhuman agency
in the action structure, i.e., more than one ‘special’-marker is better than
only one. Finally, in these religious actions, participants judged that having
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an agent capable of intending a particular outcome was more important
than performing a particular action. Changing the action of the ritual was
not as devastating to the intended consequences than changing the agent
— even if the agent was performing the appropriate action.
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the social action hy-
pothesis. Participants, having no familiarity with the rituals in question,
had converging intuitions regarding which components were most impor-
tant for the ritual success. Namely, having some connection to superhuman
agency (via the ‘special’-markers) and having the appropriate agent. Note
that having the right agent as more important than having the right action
runs counter to our knowledge of real world physical/mechanistic causa-
tion. So, perhaps, rather than having intuitive theoretical knowledge to
deal with actions such as religious rituals, participants simply countered
their ordinary intuitions. That is, an alternative explanation is that because
these were strange action sequences with “specialness” explicitly involved
in 75% of them, participants were left trying to  nd a way to make their
answers special as well. They tried to make relevant the specialness of the
actions. The obvious solution is to take what comes naturally and turn it
on its head. This relevance account is addressed in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In addition to the relevance account, two other potential problems might
lurk in Experiment 1. Though somewhat improbable, one might suggest
that the results of Experiment 1 could be explained as only demonstrating
that there is something about the particular rituals and permutations used
that biased participants to consider agents more important for success than
actions. Or perhaps, this population of participants is of a cultural group
that heavily stresses the importance of agents regardless of the type of
action being described: results are the consequence of who agents are
more so than what they do.
Experiment 2 sought to address these counter-explanations using a
between-subjects manipulation. One group of participants completed a task
very similar to that used in Experiment 1, rating the likelihood of success of
various actions with some connection to superhuman agents. For this  rst
group, results were predicted to be comparable to Experiment 1 with the
agent being regarded as relatively more important than the speci c action.
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A second group of participants rated the same actions described without
any connection to superhuman agents. That is, nothing in the actions was
described as “special.”
Because the actions were still bizarre and set on another world, the
relevance account would predict that participants in this condition would
likewise answer counter to their natural inclinations and rate agents as
more important. Likewise, if the results of Experiment 1 were due to
bias in the items used or due to something about the population samples,
participants in the second group would likewise be expected to rate agents
as more important than actions. Alternatively, if the importance of agents
over actions in Experiment 1 was due to participants having represented
the special actions as social events as hypothesized, then participants in the
non-special condition would rate actions as more important than agents,
because the actions would no longer be social events but mere mechanistic
ones.
Method
Participants. Sixty American Protestant liberal arts college students (32
female, 28 male, mean age 19.0 years) from introductory psychology
courses participated.
Materials & Procedure. In both conditions the “religious” condition and the
“other-world” condition (detailed below), the experimenter presented each
participant with a set of eight  ctitious action sequences. Each of the
eight successful sequences’ descriptions was followed by seven variations
of the sequence that participants rated for likelihood of success. Of the
seven variations, two changed just the agent in the original sequence,
two changed just the action, two changed just the instrument used in
the original, and one was a restatement of the original. For example, one
item from the “religious” condition read:
Given that: A special person cleans a trumpet with a special cloth and
the village is protected from an epidemic. How likely is each of the
following actions to protect the village from an epidemic? Please rate each
action: 1 D extremely likely the action will work, 7 D extremely unlikely.
a) A special person cleans a trumpet with a special plant. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) A special beetle cleans a trumpet with a special cloth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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c) A special person cleans a trumpet with a special paper. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d) A special dog cleans a trumpet with a special cloth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e) A special person covers a trumpet with a special cloth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f) A special person stuffs a trumpet with a special cloth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g) A special person cleans a trumpet with a special cloth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The order of presentation of each type of variation was randomized for
each item.
In the “religious” condition, the packet of ritual ratings included an
explanation of the term “special”: “For the following ratings, ‘special’
means someone or something that has been given special properties or
authority by the gods. All of the following are proposed religious actions.
Try to use as much of the rating scales as is reasonable.” To be sure
any results from the religious condition were due to understanding the
actions as appealing to superhuman agency and not merely a consequence
of the particular actions, a second condition was conducted. In the “other-
world” condition, the word “special” was dropped from all parts of the
descriptions, and the packet included a different explanation: “All of the
following are proposed actions on a world very much like ours. Try to use
as much of the rating scales as is reasonable.”
Results & Discussion
As in Experiment 1, participants in the religious condition rated the action
sequences with changed agents as signi cantly less likely to be successful
than sequences in which the action was changed, supporting the prediction
that having a proper agent is more important than the particular action.
Participants gave agent-changed rituals a mean rating of 5.00 (SD D
1:70) compared with 3.99 (SD D 1:51) for the action-changed rituals,
t .29/ D 3:61, p D :001. In contrast, when participants rated the same
action sequences in the other-world condition, the agent was no longer
considered most important for success. Indeed, agent-changed rituals were
rated as signi cantly more likely to succeed, M D 2:96, SD D 1:71, than
action-changed rituals, M D 3:93, SD D 1:35, t .29/ D 3:22, p D :003.
Figure 3 illustrates these results.
Unsurprisingly, the reversal in relative importance between the two
conditions was the result of a change in importance of having the right
agent. In both the religious condition and the other-world condition
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Figure 3. Mean ratings of rituals’ likely effectiveness as a function of change
type in either a religious or “other world” setting. Agent-changed sequences were
rated as signi cantly less likely to be successful than action-changed sequences in
the religious condition only. Agent-changed sequences were rated as signi cantly
more likely to be successful than action-changed sequences in the “other-world”
cognition.
changing the actions in the prototypes had comparable consequences on
the likelihood of success ratings, t .58/ D :17, p D :866. In contrast,
changing the agent in the religious condition (M D 5:00) had a far more
serious consequence than changing the agent in the other-world condition
(M D 2:96), t .58/ D 4:63, p < :001.
That relative judgments reversed as predicted between the two
conditions strongly supports the interpretation that participants used
different intuitive theories of causation to generate inferences about the
ef cacy of the actions. In the other-world condition, participants used
ordinary mechanistic causal expectations — the action is more important
to bring about a particular state of affairs than the agent. When the same
actions were performed as appealing to superhuman agency, intuitions
changed as they would in situations of social causation with agency
acquiring a more substantive role in determining the outcome.
These results also support the contention that the relative importance
of proper agent over proper action in Experiment 1 is not merely the
consequence of bias in the particular items used or peculiar to the
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population sampled. After all, this second sample from the same population
did not show an agent-bias in the other-world condition. Similar items in
Experiment 2 produced comparable results in the “religious” condition,
but intuitions in the “other-world” condition were just the opposite: action
was understood as more important than the agent. Even though the actions
were still peculiar and located on another world, participants demonstrated
completely different intuitions regarding the ef cacy of the actions between
the two conditions. These results seem to speak against the relevance
account.
General Discussion
These experiments tested three general predictions inspired by Lawson
and McCauley (1990). First, if as Lawson and McCauley argue, repre-
sentation of religious rituals uses the same cognitive architecture used for
representing any action, even people with no special knowledge of a re-
ligious system would have converging intuitions about whether or not a
given ritual is likely to be effective. Second, because the intended outcome
of religious rituals violates normal mechanistic causal expectations, it was
predicted that when judging whether a ritual might be effective, people
would consider some connection to superhuman agency more important
than any other aspect of the ritual, justifying the breach of causal expec-
tations. Third, because the rituals appeal to a superhuman agent to justify
their intended consequences, rituals are likely to be represented as social
actions. Consequently, when judging whether a ritual is effective, people
would regard having an appropriate intentional agent as relatively more
important than the particular action, as is the case in social exchanges.
The results of the experiments supported all three predictions.
Regarding the  rst prediction, Protestant Christians unfamiliar with the
 ctitious rituals converged in their intuitions about which elements of the
ritual structure were most important for the rituals’ success. Participants
could have simply guessed somewhat at random if they possessed no
intuitions about the  ctitious rituals. Had this been the case the results
would have produced mean ratings hovering around the mid-point of
the scales. But clearly, participants did have some opinions about the
relative importance of different factors. Experiment 2 demonstrated that
the convergence of expectations was not an artifact of the items used or
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exhibition of a cultural bias. Depending on the cover story used, relative
judgments changed dramatically.
Bearing on the second prediction, participants seemed to understand
that for an action to produce non-natural consequences, superhuman
agency must be involved in some way, and this connection with super-
human agents was the best predictor of success. In Experiment 1, partici-
pants could have simply rated the rituals that best matched the prototype
as most likely to be effective, ignoring the importance of ‘special’-markers.
They did not. Similarly, participants did not simply adopt a strategy of re-
versing their intuitions about causal events when considering strange, spe-
cial, or other-worldly actions. When evaluating the relative contributions
of different elements for the success of an action, participants demonstrated
converging intuitions that varied predictably with context.
Participants rated action forms with ‘special’ agents or ‘special’
instruments (when specialness was de ned as having been endowed with
unusual properties from the gods) as more likely to result in non-natural
actions than ordinary actions. This much is fairly trivial. However, this
 nding is more meaningful because of the further relative judgment that
having ‘special’-markers was more important than any other component
of the action sequence. It could have been, as in many mundane
actions, that performing the correct action was what was most important
with connection to superhuman agency occupying secondary importance.
However, participants answered that whether or not the ritual had a
‘special’-marker was more important than the particular action, instrument,
or agent involved.
Once recognizing the actions as importantly tied to superhuman
agency, participants also regarded having an appropriate intentional agent
initiate the action as more important to the success of a ritual than the
particular action, supporting the third prediction. This judgment is not
trivial. A common caricature of rituals is that their actions are highly
formulaic and carefully following each step is what leads to success. While
the actions of any given ritual are important, participants’ judgments
align with the suggestion that participants import social-causal intuitions
for evaluating religious rituals. As in ordinary social action having an
agent that intends the consequences of the actions is more important
than the actions themselves in determining a successful outcome. In the
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“other-world” condition of Experiment 2, the connection with superhuman
agency was removed, rendering the events as instances of odd mechanistic
causation. Consequently, participants rated the agent as signi cantly less
important than in the “religious” condition and less important than the
particular action.
That judgments pertaining to religious rituals are informed by ordinary
cognition regarding social actions should not be confused with the claim
that cultural knowledge is irrelevant. Surely explicit tuition regarding the
ef cacy of rituals plays a central role in ritual practitioners’ thought about
their rituals. However, the role of ordinary cognition would be expected to
exert pressure on religious ritual practices in at least three ways. First, as
new rituals are developed, intuitive expectations generated by an ordinary
action representation system would guide what become of cial judgments
about the relative importance of the ritual components. Theological and
doctrinal positions that are at least somewhat intuitive would be more
likely to be suggested and embraced. Further, teaching regarding rituals
that resonate with intuitive expectations are more likely to be remembered,
resist distortion, and be passed on than concepts with no basis in ordinary
representations (Boyer 1994). Likewise, when thinking about rituals in the
absence of doctrinal instruction or in situations for which no relevant
precedence is salient, ordinary cognition is likely to generate expectations,
predictions, and inferences. Suppose a rarely performed ritual fails and
there is no orthodox explanation for such a failure. In this case, the
search for explanations would begin with ordinary conceptions. Based on
the results of the present experiments, “Was the agent who performed
the ritual really quali ed?” would be asked more frequently than, “Did
the person perform the action correctly?” to determine the cause of
failure.
In addition to supporting the claim that religious rituals are represented
using general conceptual structures for action representation, these studies
lend credence to the contention of various scholars of religion that cognitive
and psychological factors should occupy more attention in the study of
religion and culture (Boyer 1994; McCauley & Lawson 1993; Sperber
1975). Relying only on cultural factors to explain culture is not the only,
nor necessarily the best, available option.
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